Transparent, explainable, and accountable AI for robotics

To create fair and accountable AI and robotics, we need precise regulation and better methods to certify, explain, and audit inscrutable systems

Counterfactual Explanations without Opening the Black Box: Automated Decisions and the GDPR

There has been much discussion of the right to explanation in the EU General Data Protection Regulation, and its existence, merits, and disadvantages. Implementing a right to explanation that opens the black box of algorithmic decision-making faces major legal and technical barriers. Explaining the functionality of complex algorithmic decision-making systems and their rationale in specific cases is a technically challenging problem. Some explanations may offer little meaningful information to data subjects, raising questions around their value. Explanations of automated decisions need not hinge on the general public understanding how algorithmic systems function. Even though such interpretability is of great importance and should be pursued, explanations can, in principle, be offered without opening the black box. Looking at explanations as a means to help a data subject act rather than merely understand, one could gauge the scope and content of explanations according to the specific goal or action they are intended to support. From the perspective of individuals affected by automated decision-making, we propose three aims for explanations: (1) to inform and help the individual understand why a particular decision was reached, (2) to provide grounds to contest the decision if the outcome is undesired, and (3) to understand what would need to change in order to receive a desired result in the future, based on the current decision-making model. We assess how each of these goals finds support in the GDPR. We suggest data controllers should offer a particular type of explanation, unconditional counterfactual explanations, to support these three aims. These counterfactual explanations describe the smallest change to the world that can be made to obtain a desirable outcome, or to arrive at the closest possible world, without needing to explain the internal logic of the system

Why Fairness Cannot Be Automated: Bridging the Gap Between EU Non-Discrimination Law and AI

This article identifies a critical incompatibility between European notions of discrimination and existing statistical measures of fairness. First, we review the evidential requirements to bring a claim under EU non-discrimination law. Due to the disparate nature of algorithmic and human discrimination, the EU's current requirements are too contextual, reliant on intuition, and open to judicial interpretation to be automated. Second, we show how the legal protection offered by non-discrimination law is challenged when AI, not humans, discriminate. Humans discriminate due to negative attitudes (e.g. stereotypes, prejudice) and unintentional biases (e.g. organisational practices or internalised stereotypes) which can act as a signal to victims that discrimination has occurred. Finally, we examine how existing work on fairness in machine learning lines up with procedures for assessing cases under EU non-discrimination law. We propose "conditional demographic disparity" (CDD) as a standard baseline statistical measurement that aligns with the European Court of Justice's "gold standard." Establishing a standard set of statistical evidence for automated discrimination cases can help ensure consistent procedures for assessment, but not judicial interpretation, of cases involving AI and automated systems. Through this proposal for procedural regularity in the identification and assessment of automated discrimination, we clarify how to build considerations of fairness into automated systems as far as possible while still respecting and enabling the contextual approach to judicial interpretation practiced under EU non-discrimination law. N.B. Abridged abstrac

The Unfairness of Fair Machine Learning: Levelling down and strict egalitarianism by default

In recent years fairness in machine learning (ML) has emerged as a highly active area of research and development. Most define fairness in simple terms, where fairness means reducing gaps in performance or outcomes between demographic groups while preserving as much of the accuracy of the original system as possible. This oversimplification of equality through fairness measures is troubling. Many current fairness measures suffer from both fairness and performance degradation, or "levelling down," where fairness is achieved by making every group worse off, or by bringing better performing groups down to the level of the worst off. When fairness can only be achieved by making everyone worse off in material or relational terms through injuries of stigma, loss of solidarity, unequal concern, and missed opportunities for substantive equality, something would appear to have gone wrong in translating the vague concept of 'fairness' into practice. This paper examines the causes and prevalence of levelling down across fairML, and explore possible justifications and criticisms based on philosophical and legal theories of equality and distributive justice, as well as equality law jurisprudence. We find that fairML does not currently engage in the type of measurement, reporting, or analysis necessary to justify levelling down in practice. We propose a first step towards substantive equality in fairML: "levelling up" systems by design through enforcement of minimum acceptable harm thresholds, or "minimum rate constraints," as fairness constraints. We likewise propose an alternative harms-based framework to counter the oversimplified egalitarian framing currently dominant in the field and push future discussion more towards substantive equality opportunities and away from strict egalitarianism by default. N.B. Shortened abstract, see paper for full abstract

The ethics of algorithms: mapping the debate

In information societies, operations, decisions and choices previously left to humans are increasingly delegated to algorithms, which may advise, if not decide, about how data should be interpreted and what actions should be taken as a result. More and more often, algorithms mediate social processes, business transactions, governmental decisions, and how we perceive, understand, and interact among ourselves and with the environment. Gaps between the design and operation of algorithms and our understanding of their ethical implications can have severe consequences affecting individuals as well as groups and whole societies. This paper makes three contributions to clarify the ethical importance of algorithmic mediation. It provides a prescriptive map to organise the debate. It reviews the current discussion of ethical aspects of algorithms. And it assesses the available literature in order to identify areas requiring further work to develop the ethics of algorithms

Why a right to explanation of automated decision-making does not exist in the General Data Protection Regulation

Since approval of the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in 2016, it has been widely and repeatedly claimed that the GDPR will legally mandate a ‘right to explanation’ of all decisions made by automated or artificially intelligent algorithmic systems. This right to explanation is viewed as an ideal mechanism to enhance the accountability and transparency of automated decision-making. However, there are several reasons to doubt both the legal existence and the feasibility of such a right. In contrast to the right to explanation of specific automated decisions claimed elsewhere, the GDPR only mandates that data subjects receive meaningful, but properly limited, information (Articles 13-15) about the logic involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences of automated decision-making systems, what we term a ‘right to be informed’. Further, the ambiguity and limited scope of the ‘right not to be subject to automated decision-making’ contained in Article 22 (from which the alleged ‘right to explanation’ stems) raises questions over the protection actually afforded to data subjects. These problems show that the GDPR lacks precise language as well as explicit and well-defined rights and safeguards against automated decision-making, and therefore runs the risk of being toothless. We propose a number of legislative and policy steps that, if taken, may improve the transparency and accountability of automated decision-making when the GDPR comes into force in 2018

Beyond ideals: why the (medical) AI industry needs to motivate behavioural change in line with fairness and transparency values, and how it can do it

Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly relied upon by clinicians for making diagnostic and treatment decisions, playing an important role in imaging, diagnosis, risk analysis, lifestyle monitoring, and health information management. While research has identified biases in healthcare AI systems and proposed technical solutions to address these, we argue that effective solutions require human engagement. Furthermore, there is a lack of research on how to motivate the adoption of these solutions and promote investment in designing AI systems that align with values such as transparency and fairness from the outset. Drawing on insights from psychological theories, we assert the need to understand the values that underlie decisions made by individuals involved in creating and deploying AI systems. We describe how this understanding can be leveraged to increase engagement with de-biasing and fairness-enhancing practices within the AI healthcare industry, ultimately leading to sustained behavioral change via autonomy-supportive communication strategies rooted in motivational and social psychology theories. In developing these pathways to engagement, we consider the norms and needs that govern the AI healthcare domain, and we evaluate incentives for maintaining the status quo against economic, legal, and social incentives for behavior change in line with transparency and fairness values

Recommendations and User Agency: The Reachability of Collaboratively-Filtered Information

Recommender systems often rely on models which are trained to maximize accuracy in predicting user preferences. When the systems are deployed, these models determine the availability of content and information to different users. The gap between these objectives gives rise to a potential for unintended consequences, contributing to phenomena such as filter bubbles and polarization. In this work, we consider directly the information availability problem through the lens of user recourse. Using ideas of reachability, we propose a computationally efficient audit for top-$N$ linear recommender models. Furthermore, we describe the relationship between model complexity and the effort necessary for users to exert control over their recommendations. We use this insight to provide a novel perspective on the user cold-start problem. Finally, we demonstrate these concepts with an empirical investigation of a state-of-the-art model trained on a widely used movie ratings dataset.Comment: appeared at FAccT '2

FACE:Feasible and Actionable Counterfactual Explanations

Work in Counterfactual Explanations tends to focus on the principle of "the closest possible world" that identifies small changes leading to the desired outcome. In this paper we argue that while this approach might initially seem intuitively appealing it exhibits shortcomings not addressed in the current literature. First, a counterfactual example generated by the state-of-the-art systems is not necessarily representative of the underlying data distribution, and may therefore prescribe unachievable goals(e.g., an unsuccessful life insurance applicant with severe disability may be advised to do more sports). Secondly, the counterfactuals may not be based on a "feasible path" between the current state of the subject and the suggested one, making actionable recourse infeasible (e.g., low-skilled unsuccessful mortgage applicants may be told to double their salary, which may be hard without first increasing their skill level). These two shortcomings may render counterfactual explanations impractical and sometimes outright offensive. To address these two major flaws, first of all, we propose a new line of Counterfactual Explanations research aimed at providing actionable and feasible paths to transform a selected instance into one that meets a certain goal. Secondly, we propose FACE: an algorithmically sound way of uncovering these "feasible paths" based on the shortest path distances defined via density-weighted metrics. Our approach generates counterfactuals that are coherent with the underlying data distribution and supported by the "feasible paths" of change, which are achievable and can be tailored to the problem at hand.Comment: Presented at AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society 202